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Recent scholarship in the field of contract law has concentrated on
contractual incompleteness-that is, on the fact that except in the
simplest and most basic transactions, contracting parties do not work
out all of the relevant details and contingencies of their relationship at
the outset. The reasons for incomplete contracts are varied. Some-
times parties deliberately leave terms unresolved, trusting future ne-
gotiations or social norms to fill in any problems that emerge. Other
times, they leave terms unresolved without realizing they have done
so, in part because they devote limited attention or resources to their
negotiations and in part because contracts are expressed in ordinary
language with all its ambiguities. In any event, it is routine for con-
tracting parties not to focus on the fact that their agreements contain
interpretative gaps until after a difference of opinion arises.
Most of this recent scholarship has focused on the question of what
courts should do when faced with the problem of enforcing an appar-
ently incomplete contract.1 For example, the literature on default rules
addresses the question of what terms courts should apply when the
contract is silent on a particular issue,2 the literature on the battle of
1 Milton Handler Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. Address: 435
W. 116th Street, New York, NY 10027. E-mail: ak472@columbia.edu. Website: www.colum
bia.edu/-ak472. This Essay is based on panel discussion remarks presented at the annual meet-
ing of the American Association of Law Schools, Section on Contracts, held in San Francisco,
CA, on January 8, 2005. 1 am grateful to Juliet Kostritsky both for organizing the panel and for
her helpful comments.
l See generally Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of In-
complete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 316-18 (1992); Alan
Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 277 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY].
2 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) [hereinafter Ayers & Gertner, Filling
Gaps] (arguing that default rules should be employed as a mechanism to encourage informa-
tionally advantaged parties to reveal their type before contracting); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729
(1992) [hereinafter Ayers & Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency] (same); Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Be-
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the forms discusses what courts should do when the parties' writings
disagree,3 and the literature on interpretation discusses how courts
should determine whether either of these events has arisen.4 Focusing
on such questions is sensible because when legal disputes arise over
an issue of contractual interpretation, courts must decide what to do.
On the other hand, focusing exclusively on such questions overlooks
the facts that most contractual relationships do not result in disputes
and that much of what lawyers do when designing contracts can be
understood as managing the problem of incompleteness so that the
parties can settle their affairs without resorting to costly litigation.
As I have argued elsewhere, such a court-centered perspective is
characteristic of academic legal scholarship in general.5 Elite legal
scholarship, for various historical and sociological reasons, usually
tends to address a hypothetical audience of public lawmakers. Schol-
arship focusing on transactional design, in contrast, tends to be left to
practitioner literature or to continuing legal education materials. Tell-
ingly, even scholars coming from a law-and-economics perspective
and those who strongly advocate freedom of contract tend largely to
address themselves to public lawmakers.
In this Essay, I offer a somewhat different perspective on the topic
of incomplete contracts, and in so doing, advocate, more generally, a
tween Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985) (arguing that default
rules should be chosen to provide terms that would minimize the cumulative transaction costs
incurred by parties contracting around them); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardiza-
tion and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L.
REV. 713 (1997) (arguing that in situations where network externalities prevent parties from
choosing optimal individual terms, default terms should be centrally chosen for their substantive
efficiency); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003) (noting that default rules should be set to the terms, usually simple
rules, that are easiest for the parties to escape). For a survey of this literature by one of its lead-
ing contributors, see Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in 1 NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 585.
3 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the
Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1252-57 (1982) (arguing for the use of
the mirror image rule over the use of section 2-207); Omri Ben-Shahar, An Ex-Ante View of the
Battle of the Forms: Inducing Parties to Draft Reasonable Terms, 25 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
(forthcoming 2005); Victor P. Goldberg, The "Battle of the Forms": Fairness, Efficiency, and
the Best-Shot Rule, 76. OR. L. REV. 155, 156 (1997) (urging courts to take a fairer approach in
interpreting individual contracts); John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms":
Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1307, 1311 (1986) (arguing that section 2-207 may have a critical
defect).
4 See generally Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and
the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 534 (1998) (discussing
different ways courts use the parol evidence rule); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics
of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1581, 1583-84 (2005) (discussing transaction costs
of contracts being minimized through judicial interpretation). But see Avery Wiener Katz, The
Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496 (2004)
(advocating a transactional approach to the problem of interpretation).
Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745 (1996).
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particular methodological approach to contracts scholarship and
teaching. Specifically, I argue that legal scholars should focus more
on addressing the contractual decisions of private lawmakers (that is,
transactional lawyers and their clients) and less on the decisions of
public lawmakers (that is, courts and legislatures). Stated alterna-
tively, in the language of law-and-economics, scholars should pay
greater attention to considerations of private transactional efficiency
as opposed to larger issues of social efficiency.
There are two main reasons to advocate such an approach; one rea-
son is pedagogical, and one is substantive. From a pedagogical stand-
point, relatively few law students will become judges or legislators,
but most will operate as private lawmakers in a contractual setting.
Even those who specialize in litigation will regularly create private
law in the course of negotiating settlements, which are far more
common than litigated trials. To do a good job at private lawmaking,
just as in public lawmaking, it is necessary to pay attention to policy
considerations, such as efficiency and incentives. But teachers who
emphasize policy issues only in the context of social planning fail to
deliver this lesson.
There is also a substantive reason-directly connected to the sub-
ject of this Symposium-for advocating a transactional approach to
contracts scholarship. The central lesson of the literature on incom-
plete contracts stresses that courts are not in a position to effectively
supervise many of the things that the parties know and do in negotiat-
ing and performing their agreement; rather, the parties have more in-
formation than the courts. This informational discrepancy underlies
the claim that freedom of contract is desirable from a consequentialist
standpoint as opposed to just a libertarian one.
More specifically, from an economic viewpoint, maximizing con-
tractual value requires drawing a proper balance among various deci-
sional margins and trading off reduced efficiency along one margin to
achieve enhanced efficiency along another. Richard Craswell's con-
tribution to this Symposium indicates, for instance, that transactional
efficiency depends not just on incentives for contractual performance,
6but also on the parties' investment in ex ante precautions. One should
add that it also depends on mitigation behavior, allocation of contrac-
tual risks, acquisition and exchange of information, negotiation, as
well as the parties' internal organizational arrangements. To make the
appropriate tradeoffs among these various dimensions of efficiency,
however, one must have detailed information about a variety of fac-
6 Richard Craswell, The "Incomplete Contracts" Literature and Efficient Precautions, 56
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 151 (2005).
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tors, such as relative elasticities of demand, expected returns on in-
vestment, the discount rates the parties attach to future costs and
benefits, relative bargaining power, costs of renegotiation, and the
like. But, most of this information is local knowledge; it varies among
contracting parties and is much more likely to be accessible to them
in the context of planning than to a court in the context of adjudicat-
ing a dispute or to a legislature in the context of policy making.7
As a result, the economic analysis of contracts is likely to be more
useful for private parties than for public officials, especially in a legal
regime such as ours that both permits and relies on broad freedom of
contract. Despite important limitations on private contracting, such as
the doctrine of unconscionability, most contract law is private and
there is much that private parties can do to implement their preferred
arrangement. In the following Sections, I outline some of the main
options and strategies available to private transactional planners in the
context of incomplete contracts.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM OF CONTRACTUAL INCOMPLETENESS
To identify the appropriate approach to the problem of contractual
incompleteness, one must first isolate its causes. The term "incom-
plete contracts," however, like the term "transaction costs," encom-
passes several distinct issues that suggest quite different policy and
planning responses.8 Some of the reasons contracts are incomplete
arise out of ex ante contract-writing costs, such as the direct costs of
time and effort spent negotiating. These costs would exist even in the
absence of any market or transactional failure and the parties may be
capable of directly economizing on them. But, other sources of con-
tractual incompleteness are more problematic. Bounded rationality
may lead the parties to ignore contingencies that have low probability
or that produce cognitive dissonance for them. If the parties have
asymmetric information regarding some aspects of their exchange, the
better informed party may prefer to leave an issue unraised for strate-
gic reasons. 9 If negotiations are conducted by subordinate agents
7 Cf. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945) (ar-
guing that such local knowledge is pervasive and renders central state planning inherently less
efficient than decentralized economic exchange).
8 See, e.g., Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imper-
fect World: What To Do When Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incom-
plete Contracts, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 323 (2004) (providing a discussion and taxonomy on such
issues).




whose incentives are not well aligned with the interests of their prin-
cipals, the agents may negotiate with less care. °
These various possibilities can be illustrated through an imagina-
tive reading of the classic case of Sherwood v. Walker," in which the
parties neglected to specify explicitly what would happen in the event
that the subject of the contract, the apparently barren cow, Rose 2d of
Aberlone, turned out to be fertile. While the case report does not
make entirely clear why this failure occurred, the majority opinion
suggests that the cause was bounded rationality: the parties simply did
not consider that the cow might be fertile, and so they suffered from
mutual mistake.' 2 The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, suggests
that the contract was not incomplete at all and that at least the buyer
understood that the transaction was a speculative one.' 3 But other in-
terpretations of the case are also possible. The fact that the buyer un-
derstood the risks does not imply either that the seller did or that the
contract was complete. Perhaps the buyer, who had the opportunity to
inspect the cow more recently than the seller, had inside information
regarding her condition that he should have disclosed. Perhaps the
seller's agent breached a duty of loyalty by disclosing proprietary in-
formation to the buyer so that the contract needed to be rescinded to
avoid unjust enrichment.
Such problems of ex ante negotiation have been reasonably well
discussed by legal commentators and do not require any unfamiliar
theoretical concepts. More recently, however, economists have put
forward additional and novel explanations for contractual incom-
pleteness that turn not on negotiation costs ex ante, but on enforce-
ment costs ex post. For example, one explanation that has attracted
particular attention in the economic literature can be denoted strategic
renegotiation design. This explanation starts with the observation that
rational parties, when negotiating a contract, should anticipate that
they may need to renegotiate later. Indeed, they cannot preclude later
renegotiation, because the law of contracts does not allow the parties
to create a contract that cannot later be modified.' 4 As a result, the
parties have an incentive to choose terms that will structure the sub-
sequent rounds of bargaining.' 5 For instance, it may pay to leave
10 Of course, depending on the agent's reward structure, the agent might also spend too
much time and effort on contract negotiation, as when business lawyers are accused of "over-
lawyering" a deal.
33 N.W. 919 (1887).
12 Id. at 923.
I3 Id. at 924-25 (Sherwood, J., dissenting).
14 See Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Con-
tract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (1997).
15 See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:
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some terms open in order to leave room for subsequent bargaining
later. 16
A second explanation that has also received significant attention in
the recent economic literature, and on which the other participants in
this Symposium have focused, relates to problems of asymmetric in-
formation ex post. Specifically, because the parties have better infor-
mation about the contract than courts or third party enforcers do, it
may not be possible for an adjudicating tribunal to determine, at a
reasonable cost, what the contract provided, whether the parties com-
plied with their duties, or what the resulting damages might be. And
because of these ex post costs of adjudication, it does not pay to un-
dertake the costs of contract completion ex ante.
Such informational asymmetries can be of two sorts. In some
situations, the asymmetry lies between the two parties, so that even
the victim of a contract breach cannot determine its existence or
consequences (as in the case of a consumer who does not know
whether an auto mechanic has correctly repaired a defective part). In
other cases, the asymmetry lies only between the two parties on the
one hand and a third-party enforcer, such as a court, on the other (as
when an experienced trader can tell that its supplier has delivered
nonconforming goods, but the nonconformity is not apparent to a
nonspecialist). In either event, however, the promise in question is
effectively unenforceable and, therefore, not worthwhile to the parties
to spell out (although in the case of two-party asymmetries, it may be
possible to use the prospect of repeat dealing as an inducement
mechanism). We can call this the problem of unverifiable
information, or unveriflability. 17
A familiar example from the law of contract damages illustrates
the problem of unverifiability. Consider the concept of opportunity
reliance, that is, reliance on a promise that takes the form of lost op-
portunities. Fuller and Perdue famously argued that in a competitive
market setting, the expenditure and reliance measures of contract
damages are equivalent because the promisee's reliance includes the
A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John
Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988).
16 See generally B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Incomplete Contracts and
Strategic Ambiguity, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 902 (1998); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Agreeing Now
To Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but Do Not Rule In 1-54 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 10397, 2004).
17 The economic theory literature uses the term "observability" to denote information-
al asymmetries between the parties, and reserves the term "verifiability" to denote infor-
mational asymmetries between the parties and a third-party enforcer, but this terminology is
more conventional than functional. Instead, this Essay will use the two-party/three-party termi-
nology for the sake of functional clarity.
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lost opportunity to enter into a contract with another party who would
not have breached.18 But in a nonmarket setting, such opportunities do
not exist and the equivalence need not hold, so that expectation dam-
ages will generally overcompensate the reliance interest. On the other
hand, a reliance measure is likely to undercompensate the reliance
interest because of the practical difficulties of proving reliance that
takes the form of inaction. Many courts will choose overcompensa-.
tion as the lesser of two evils in this regard, but the nonverifiability of
the underlying reliance renders the remedy imperfect.
As indicated above, the appropriate response to incomplete con-
tracts depends on which of these determinants are at work. For exam-
ple, consider the situations in which there are no informational
asymmetries, but contracts are incomplete as a result of the simple
costs of time and negotiating effort. In this case, if it is costly to add a
term to the contract and the event with which it deals is of sufficiently
low probability, it is optimal for the parties to leave the problem un-
addressed until later. Suppose, for example, that it costs $500 in law-
yers' fees to add a contractual term that specifies what happens if
trade is disrupted by a cyber-terrorist incident that shuts down elec-
tronic payment mechanisms. Also, suppose that it would cost
$500,000 ex post to litigate a dispute over the matter. If the chances
of the incident are less than 1/1000, it is cheaper for the parties to run
the risk of contractual failure, even if the result is litigation.
Conversely, suppose that contractual incompleteness is caused by
strategic withholding of information ex ante, along the lines of Ayres
and Gertner's analysis.' 9 In this case, it is possible, in principle, to
improve the efficiency of exchange by adopting a penalty default
term. Such a penalty will better promote precontractual disclosure if
the private value of the information is not too large. But, the prospect
of such efficient interventions is not generally applicable to all con-
tractual settings. For instance, if the private value of information is
large, the informed party will prefer to suffer the penalty of inefficient
contractual terms in order to enjoy the informational advantage.2 °
'8 L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46
YALE L.J. 52 (1936). But see Robert D. Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of
Contract, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1432 (1985) (pointing out that this equivalence is only an approxima-
tion and must be adjusted to account for the probability that the alternate contractual partner
would have breached).
19 See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 2.
20 See Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract
Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 648-64 (1990) (demonstrating that penalty defaults are inef-
ficient if the informed party lacks bargaining power in a situation of bilateral monopoly); see
also Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547,
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The nature and origin of contractual incompleteness (and the na-
ture of the substantive issue) can determine whether the best policy
response comes from state intervention or from private transactional
planning. To return to the cyber-terrorism example, if litigation is
costly and insurance is available, it may be best to send the disputes
over failed payments to a neutral arbitrator who will decide the issue
on unreviewable grounds. On the other hand, if there are economies
of scale or coordination in resolving ex post disputes, as may be the
case if the payment system fails for a large number of parties, and
losses are minimized by treating back-to-back transactions consis-
tently, then it may be worth bearing the costs of litigation in the pub-
lic courts. It may even be worth state subsidy if that is the only way to
take advantage of the scale economies.
Each of the various causes of contractual incompleteness men-
tioned above leads to different policy implications. If parties leave
contracts open in order to improve renegotiation incentives, for in-
stance, it does them no good for courts to step in after the fact and fill
gaps. Conversely, if contracts are left open because of shirking by
subordinate agents, ex post gap filling by courts, assuming they are
better and more faithful than the original subordinates, may improve
the principal's monitoring capacities. Relaxing the assumption, if
courts' policy preferences diverge from those of the parties, there will
be an incentive for the parties to exit the public enforcement system
through private arbitration or otherwise.
Accordingly, economic theory affords ample opportunity to dis-
cuss how courts or legislatures should respond to the phenomenon of
incomplete contracts. As explained earlier, however, the purpose of
this Essay is to investigate private approaches to the problem; and in
the next Section, I identify some typical strategies that are available to
contractual planners as well as the kinds of considerations that help
determine which of these strategies are worth pursuing.
IIm. TRANSACTIONAL STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING
CONTRACTUAL INCOMPLETENESS
In this Section, I identify and discuss four types of strategies for
managing contractual incompleteness: (1) investing ex ante to lower
the cost of contract completion ex post, (2) contracting ex ante over
1589 (1999) (demonstrating that penalty defaults may be inefficient if asymmetric information
is multidimensional and revelation along one dimension would allow the recipient to draw in-
ferences about another); Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract
Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1885, 1886 (2000) (arguing that penalty defaults may be inefficient when
the information would reveal trade secrets valuable beyond the instant contract).
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the methods of interpretation to be applied ex post, (3) delegating au-
thority to complete the contract to either one of the principal parties
or to a third party, and (4) designing contractual provisions that make
the agreement self-enforcing or that encourage efficient renegotiation.
In practice, these four categories will overlap and serve as comple-
ments as well as substitutes. For instance, establishing clearer guide-
lines for contract interpretation will promote smoother renegotiation.
Accordingly, the discussion, though it should be understood as illus-
trative rather than systematic, makes it possible to draw some general
lessons regarding when these strategies can be profitably used.
A. Ex Ante Investment in Lowering the Cost of Contract Completion
The formal literature on incomplete contracting usually treats veri-
fiability as a discrete variable, implicitly assuming that a contractual
term is either verifiable or not. This assumption, however, is typically
made for expositional purposes, not descriptive accuracy. In reality,
verifiability is an endogenous function of the choices parties make in
the contract. Parties can make various investments up front that will
lower the cost of information ex post. Most obviously, they can spend
more time and resources adding written terms to their agreement,
though the possibilities go beyond this obvious step. A related strat-
egy is to incorporate terms by reference to existing documents or
commercial practice; this can be done in various ways and, in the con-
text of contracts for the sale of goods, is specifically authorized by
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. For example, U.C.C.
section 2-306, which governs requirement and output contracts, di-
rects courts to use any stated estimate provided by the parties as the
basis for judging the reasonableness of quantity variations. 2! More
generally, U.C.C. section 1-102(3) empowers contracting parties to
give more specific content to the general duties of care, diligence,
reasonableness, and good faith that are implied in the performance of
every contract.
22
Perhaps more interesting for our purposes here, however, are in-
vestment strategies that are better described as managerial rather than
legal. Lawyers may not be accustomed to thinking of such strategies
as being within the scope of their professional expertise. Because
managerial approaches to problem solving often operate as substitutes
or complements to legal ones, however, good commercial lawyers
need to be familiar with their use and design.
21 U.C.C. § 2-306 (amended 2005).
22 U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (amended 2005).
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Three examples illustrate this point. First, parties can increase their
investments in record-keeping systems, such as computerized data-
bases for tracking inventory or correspondence. Such systems make it
easier to produce evidence relating to performance, either in court or
in ex post negotiation with a counterparty, and thus, lower the
chances of a dispute over the date of shipment. Second, parties can
invest in systems that generate information about performance once
underway, as is the case with inspection clauses that appear in most
long-distance shipment contracts. Such early-warning systems allow
potential difficulties to be identified while they can still be corrected
or mitigated. Third, parties can invest in improving the incentives of
their negotiating agents so that the agents are less motivated to shirk
when forming contracts initially. Such incentives could be achieved
by restructuring compensation (for example, docking a salesperson's
commission following sales that generate a contractual dispute) or by
assigning the job of bargaining to more senior agents whose incen-
tives are presumably better aligned with the organization as a whole.
All these strategies have disadvantages, the up-front expense being
the most obvious. Writing and negotiating an additional term incurs a
certain and immediate cost that may not be justified if the contin-
gency it covers is sufficiently remote. Restructuring systemic prac-
tices, such as record keeping or employee compensation, entails over-
head costs that are less worth incurring for contracts that have low
value or that are idiosyncratic in nature. But for repeat players who
can amortize the costs over multiple related transactions, such in-
vestments make more sense.
B. Contracting Ex Ante Over the Methods of Ex Post Interpretation
A second and related strategy is to agree in advance that if an ap-
parent contractual gap arises, it will be dealt with using low-cost in-
terpretative methods. An illustrative and familiar example is provided
by the classic liquidated damages clause that directs courts not to look
into actual damages even if there is reason to think that the inquiry
will provide a more accurate measure of the promisee's loss.
More generally, parties can limit the ex post costs of contract
completion by including clauses that direct courts to apply relatively
formal standards when interpreting the parties' contract. For example,
they can attempt to prevent courts from investigating the history of
their negotiations by including in their contract a so-called merger
clause stating that the writing expresses their entire agreement and
that all prior understandings or agreements have been merged into it.
[Vol. 56:1
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This tactic will not prevent a sufficiently determined court from
entering into such an investigation, as there are various doctrinal tools
that a court can use to justify striking the merger clause. But the tactic
will reduce the chances of such an inquiry because all common-law
courts follow at least a liberal version of the parol evidence rule.
Similarly, parties to sales transactions can provide, pursuant to U.C.C.
section 2-209, that any modifications to their contract must be in
24writing. These types of terms reduce the likelihood that a court will
inquire into oral, postcontractual communications when interpreting
an agreement. Parties can also embed their agreements in the form of
specialized devices, such as negotiable instruments or letters of credit
that are governed by distinct bodies of law that apply a more formalist
interpretive regime than does the common law of contracts
generally.25
Contracting parties can also opt into relatively formalistic interpre-
tative regimes by designating the tribunal or rule of law that will hear
any dispute that arises under their agreement; and again there are
various ways to achieve such a result. Choice of law clauses, which
direct courts to apply the substantive rules of a particular jurisdiction,
are a particularly common device in this regard, as jurisdictions can
vary considerably in their level of formalism.26 Other possibilities
include forum selection clauses, which specify a particular location
where any litigation must be brought, and arbitration clauses, which
require disputes to be heard in the first instance before a private rather
than a public tribunal. Even when the substantive rule of interpreta-
tion is the same, differences in local legal culture, procedural and evi-
dentiary rules, or other resource constraints may make one tribunal
considerably less inclined to take an open-ended approach to gap fill-
ing than another.
23 See Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A Comparative Analy-
sis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 149, 167 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000)
(providing a survey of case law comparing common-law jurisdictions taking liberal and strict
approaches to the parol evidence rule).
24 U.C.C. § 2-209 (amended 2005).
25 See Peter A. Alces, An Essay on Independence, Interdependence, and the Suretyship
Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 465-76 (1993) (discussing formal interpretative regime of
the law of letters of credit); Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments,
13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 445-61 (1979) (discussing and also critiquing the formal interpreta-
tive regime of negotiable instrument law).
26 See Scott, supra note 23, at 164 (pointing out that some courts apply activist interpreta-
tive methodology while others continue to utilize the restrained approach of the common law).
See generally Erin Ann O'Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Con-
tractual Choice of Law, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1549, 1559 (2000) (discussing the use of choice-of-
law clauses and observing that courts routinely enforce them).
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Formalistic regimes of interpretation, however, have their own
characteristic disadvantages: 27 They can introduce unnecessary risk
into the parties' relationship if judges vary in their experiences with
regard to commercial matters. They can encourage parties to expend
extra resources in negotiation, on one hand by attempting to manipu-
late the formal text of the agreement in their favor, and on the other
hand by attempting to prevent the counterparty from doing so. They
take power to set the terms of the agreement away from sales and
purchasing agents, and confer it on lawyers and other drafting agents
who control the production of formal contractual documents---even
when the former agents are better placed to promote overall organiza-
tional interests than the latter agents. They may make it more difficult
or risky for third parties to provide complementary services, such as
financing or brokerage, if such service providers find it harder to ob-
serve the details of the written contract than the contracting parties'
ordinary business practices.
Balancing these rival considerations will depend on the particular
circumstances, but it is still possible to draw some generalizations in
this regard. For example, small and inexperienced traders are rela-
tively less well placed to monitor the counterparty's standard-form
contracts for inefficient terms. Such traders are likely to do their own
contract negotiating but to contract out when acquiring legal services,
and they are less likely able to spread interpretation risk over a large
number of transactions. Contracting for formalistic interpretation is
likely to be a relatively costly strategy for them, other things being
equal. Conversely, large and experienced mercantile traders are more
likely to have the ability to monitor and control the texts of their con-
tractual documents but are less likely to have good control over far-
flung sales and purchasing agents.' And, given their size, these traders
are likely to face more risk from biased decision-makers than they are
from ordinary interpretative variance.
C. Delegating Discretion to Complete the Contract
A third strategy is to authorize one of the parties to fill in any con-
tractual gaps that may arise during performance. For example, the
proverbial "blank check" allows a seller of goods or services to
choose the contract price.28 Requirements contracts authorize a buyer
21 See generally Katz, supra note 4, at 508-12 (cataloguing the stereotypical advantages
and disadvantages of interpretative formalism).
28 Under Article 3 of the U.C.C., an incomplete negotiable instrument that is completed in
a manner authorized by the signer may be enforced according to its terms as augmented by
completion. U.C.C. § 3-115 (amended 2005).
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of goods to specify the contract quantity, while output contracts con-
fer that authority upon the seller.29 Option contracts empower one of
the parties to elect whether the proposed exchange will be completed
while satisfaction clauses provide a softer option that allows a buyer
to withdraw from the exchange based on the buyer's subjective valua-
tion of the seller's performance.3 °
The doctrine of waiver, as applied to contractual conditions, plays
a similar role. Quite often it is possible for the parties to identify some
verifiable event or action that, while not of substantive importance to
the value of the transaction, is correlated with some unverifiable event
that is of substantive importance. The former event is, thus, useful as
a proxy for the latter in the event of a dispute but can be waived if all
goes well. For example, in the well-known case of Clark v. West,3 1 a
publisher conditioned an author's royalty rate on the author's abstain-
ing from the consumption of alcohol and although the author failed to
so abstain, successfully recovered the full royalty on the grounds that
the manuscript met the desired standard of quality and the publisher's
agent waived the condition. 32 In that case, as the majority opinion in-
dicated, it is most likely that the publisher was interested in the au-
thor's temperance as a proxy for quality rather than for its own sake
and, because there was no real dispute over quality, the proxy no
longer had any separate purpose.33
Conferring such discretion to complete the contract does not
eliminate the need for ex post involvement by a court or other tribu-
nal. It does limit the scope of such supervision, however, because the
tribunal need not conduct a gap-filling inquiry from scratch. Instead,
it can sit in review of the authorized party's original decision, which
is likely to be a less costly enterprise.
29 See id. § 2-306.
30 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 (1981) ("Option Contracts"); id.
§ 45 ("Option Contract Created by Part Performance or Tender"); id. § 228 ("Satisfaction of the
Obligor as a Condition").
"' 86 N.E. 1 (1908).
32 Id. at 5.
13 As the court explained:
It is not a contract to write books in order that the plaintiff shall keep sober, but a
contract containing a stipulation that he shall keep sober so that he may write satis-
factory books. When we view the contract from this standpoint, it will readily be
perceived that the particular stipulation is not the consideration for the contract, but
simply one of its conditions ....
Id. at 3-4. A more modem (and commercially much more important) illustration of this strategy
can be found in the specialized area of letters of credit in which it is apparently routine for pay-
ors to waive technical defects in presentation that, as a matter of formal legal obligation, would
render a letter unenforceable. Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Trans-
actions, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2494, 2513 (2000); see also Avery Wiener Katz, Informality as a
Bilateral Assurance Mechanism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2554, 2554-55 (2000) (commenting on
Mann's theoretical account of letters of credit).
2005]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
This strategy has one major and obvious disadvantage-namely,
discretion creates room for opportunism. For instance, under a re-
quirements contract, a buyer may attempt to take advantage of a fa-
vorable price in a tight market by purchasing for resale or stockpiling
for future use. Similarly, if the majority opinion's assessment of the
situation is to be credited, the publisher in Clark seems to have seized
on the temperance condition as an excuse for reducing its payment
obligation when the exchange went sour for unrelated reasons. This
risk of opportunism explains why most of these doctrines were disfa-
vored under the traditional common law and why, under modem doc-
trine, the exercise of discretion is regulated by doctrines such as good
faith.34 But this strategy is likely to be imperfect, in that some oppor-
tunistic actions are likely to escape review because of the costs of
verifying their true nature.
Accordingly, the discretion-conferring strategy will not be useful
when parties cannot reasonably assess the risk of such opportunism.
No one, for instance, would hand a blank check to a stranger. But, a
party with an established commercial reputation can be ceded
discretion at relatively low cost because the reputation serves both as
a benchmark for assessing risk and as an incentive for good
performance.35 In addition, ceding discretion may, in some situations,
be an effective way for a party credibly to signal its reliability. A
retail merchant might wish to establish liberal return policies
(effectively granting discretion to the buyer whether to go through
with the deal) in order to signal product quality or a merchant might
grant the right to demand an open-ended quantity in order to signal
adequate production capacity. A debtor might wish to grant a creditor
the right to accelerate the debt upon insecurity to signal a low
probability of default.
36
34 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305(2) (amended 2005) (instructing that a price to be fixed by
buyer or seller is to be interpreted as a price to be set in good faith); id. § 2-306 (noting that the
quantity demanded under requirements contract or supplied-under-output contract is limited by
duty of good faith); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84(l)(a) (1981) (pointing out
that the waiver doctrine is not applicable to conditions that form a material part of a contract's
consideration). But see U.C.C. § 5-108(a) (1995) (substituting a strict compliance principle as to
conditions in letters of credit for the doctrines of waiver and estoppel that would otherwise
apply under law and equity under section 1-103(b)).
35 See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Con-
tractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 633-37 (1981) (explaining how reputational incen-
tives can substitute for state-provided legal contract enforcement).
36 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 730, 732, 747-48 (1989) (defending acceleration clauses, as well as other pro-
creditor remedial terms, on such grounds).
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D. Designing Structural Provisions That Promote Cooperation or
Channel Renegotiation
Finally, as suggested in the previous Section, it is often possible to
design agreements with an eye toward influencing subsequent per-
formance or renegotiation, for if the parties can complete the contract
through voluntary cooperation, then arbitration or litigation will be
unnecessary. This strategy is reflected by the commonplace letter of
intent or agreement to agree; it is also evidenced in the large propor-
tion of contracts that are performed or modified without incident,
notwithstanding their incompleteness.
Much contractual cooperation is motivated by the prospect of re-
peat business or maintaining a good commercial reputation, but it is
also possible to build structures into the contract that make it more
likely that cooperation will work. Here, two alternate approaches are
available. The first is to allocate one side or the other a property right
to block certain substitute transactions. Such rights can alter the bal-
ance of bargaining power, with the resulting effect on the anticipated
bargaining range serving to limit the scope of opportunism and thus
the risk to the parties' investments in their relationship. For example,
a term that grants one party control rights over a critical asset, such as
a brand name or customer list, makes it less attractive for the other
party to breach a contract or exit the relationship. The reduced value
of the exit option makes the constrained party a softer bargainer and
the protected party a harder one in any renegotiation that takes place,
thereby committing the former not to take advantage of the latter's
contractual reliance.3 7 Similar incentives are provided by noncompete
clauses, rights of first refusal, and the like.
Conversely, a second strategy motivates cooperation by making it
easy for one or both parties to exit the relationship. In this case, the
threat of exit can motivate a counterparty to behave cooperatively in
order to protect any relational investments he or she has made. For
example, consider a buyer of goods who wishes to motivate the pro-
ducer to undertake costly investments that will enhance the value of
the item being exchanged, but that are unverifiable by a third party
tribunal.3 8 Because of the unverifiability problem, it is not possible for
37 See Hart & Moore, supra note 15 (detailing a formal model demonstrating that reallo-
cating property rights can, by altering parties' anticipated outcome from noncooperation, influ-
ence their incentives to cooperate).
38 The example is based on the formal model presented by Georg Noldeke & Klaus M.
Schmidt in Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem, 26 RAND
J. ECON. 163 (1995). See also Avery Wiener Katz, The Option Element in Contracting, 90 VA.
L. REv. 2187, 2218 (2004) (explaining more generally how options can be used to promote
contractual performance).
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the seller to warrant the quality of investment. But, if the buyer is able
to observe product quality, the exchange can be successfully con-
cluded. To bring about such a situation, the parties only need to grant
the buyer an option to buy and to set the exercise price at a high
enough level that it will not be worth exercising the option unless the
seller invests optimally. In this case, the seller will be motivated to
invest in quality in order to make the sale and earn a profit, while the
buyer will be motivated by a suitable up-front payment at the time
that the option is granted.39
Similar incentives can be provided through clauses that confer a
right to terminate an agreement in response to unsatisfactory perform-
ance or to rescind/suspend one's own performance in the event of
material breach-rights to reject nonconforming goods, to demand
adequate assurances in the face of insecurity, or to declare repudiation
work similarly. In each case, the threat that the contract will be ended
and the relational investments will be destroyed operates to reinforce
an investing party's incentives to act cooperatively.4°
Such institutional arrangements-both those that inhibit exit and
those that facilitate it-can be viewed as a variant of the discretion-
conferring strategy discussed in the previous Subsection. In the for-
mer case, the discretion consists of whether to assert rights to the
critical asset and, in the latter, it consists of whether to maintain or
end the relationship. Accordingly, all the risks of discretion apply to
this strategy as well, rendering the strategy risky when the party
granted the right cannot otherwise be deterred from opportunism. As
before, the prospect of repeat business may be required as a counter-
vailing incentive.4'
This strategy will also be useful when verification costs are asym-
metric-for example, when one party is a merchant whose behavior
can be assessed by comparison to standards, such as trade usage or
course of dealing, and the other is not. In this case, it will make sense
to grant rights to the party whose performance is more easily measur-
able and, thus, enforceable.
39 There are further complications that are suppressed in the text. The seller also needs to
be assured that the buyer will not decline the option and then turn around and make a low-ball
counteroffer that the seller, having sunk its investment, would then be unable credibly to de-
cline. See Thomas P. Lyon & Eric Rasmusen, Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation,
Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 148, 161-62 (2004).
40 Cf. George L. Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Un-
der the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach, 91 HARV. L. REV. 960, 968 (1978)
(analyzing the common-law perfect tender rule in such terms).
41 Cf. Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Ar-
rangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROc.) 356, 361 (1980) (defending at-will termina-
tion clauses and similar terms as efficient responses to situations in which one party has suffi-
cient reputational motives to act cooperatively while the other does not).
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When verification costs are high on both sides, encouraging coop-
eration becomes a more difficult problem, yet there may still be ways
to address it, depending on the circumstances. Two examples illus-
trate the possibilities as well as the difficulties involved in generaliz-
ing about them. First, in settings where both price and quantity are
feasibly adjustable, the parties can balance the price term against the
quantity term in their initial contract, in turn balancing the parties'
bargaining power and promoting good bilateral investment incen-
tives. 42 Second, in settings where the parties' reliance investments are
sequential (that is, where one side finishes investing before the other
starts), then it is again possible to promote good bilateral incentives
by arranging for a buyback option at the appropriate moment and at
the appropriate strike price.43 Given the complicated incentives cre-
ated by such arrangements and their sensitivity to particular circum-
stances, however, it is hard to see how they could be implemented by
anyone other than decentralized private decision-makers.
IV. CONCLUSION
Incomplete contracts are not just a problem for public lawmakers
and adjudicators, but for the parties themselves, operating as private
lawmakers in a transactional setting. There are many different legal
and institutional arrangements that parties can devise to increase
transactional value in the face of contractual incompleteness, but the
advantages and disadvantages of these arrangements are subtle and
complicated, and depend on individual circumstances in sensitive
ways. Accordingly, in most instances, private actors will be much
more likely to make effective use of such strategies than public offi-
cials. In our role as scholars and teachers, therefore, we can do our
students and their future clients a considerable service if we spend as
much time preparing them to be effective and sophisticated transac-
42 See Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and
Optimal Investment, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 478, 479 (1996) ("[N]oncontingent fixed contracts can
often provide efficient investment incentives by balancing 'holdup contingencies' where an
investment is undercompensated against 'breach contingencies' where it is overcompensated.").
For this arrangement to work, the contract must provide for a lower quantity than the parties
expect to want to trade. The buyer's threat to counteroffer at a lower price is then counteracted
by her desire to buy a larger quantity than originally contracted for. Id. at 482.
43 See Aaron S. Edlin & Benjamin E. Hermalin, Contract Renegotiation and Options in
Agency Problems, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 395, 401-09 (2000) (discussing the need to set the
exercise date for the option before the principal invests when renegotiation is taken into ac-
count). The buyback device works only in certain circumstances, but the authors give real-world
examples that show that the assumptions of their model are realistic enough to make this a use-
ful strategy in many common contracting situations. Id.
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tional lawyers as we currently do preparing them for the role of judge,
legislator, or other public official.
